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"For all their boasting, practical men do not know either men or the world; they do not even know the 
reality of their own works. [If they could return to life], the geniuses of pure politics, the fatalia monstra 
recorded in histories, would be astounded to learn what they have done without being aware of it, and they 





"The coming of this event exceeds the condition of mastery and the conventionally accepted authority of 
what is called the ''performative''. It thus also exceeds, without contesting its pertinence, the useful 
distinction between the ''constative'' and ''performative''."2 
 
The structure of this essay's argument is simply put. It comes in the form of a number of related 
propositions concerning the nature of modern freedom, a freedom first expounded for 'us' by Machiavelli.3 
The essay opens with an account of this freedom as factical freedom; one whose condition of possibility is 
a radically contingent time without warrant. Factical freedom conditions the deciding which those like Carl 
Schmitt, for example, problematise in terms of sovereignty. Without freedom there is no decision to make, 
no exception to determine and no friend/enemy distinction to draw. Without signification there is similarly 
no formulation or articulation of such a decision.  
 
Preoccupied with the problematic of order and its entailments, Schmitt largely elides the problematic and 
entailments of the freedom of signification which are logically anterior to it. Factically free, modern man 
does not discover the law, Schmitt agrees, but he makes the law, Machiavelli maintains, by finding within 
himself the republican virtue (virtù), rather than the unmediated decisional will, required to do so. 
Freedom's virtù is ultimately underwritten by the polysemous freedom of the sign - that radically contingent 
undecidability which ultimately defines evental time itself. The Schmittean sovereign is somehow supposed 
magisterially to transcend the sign. Criticizing traditional definitions of sovereignty as, "the highest, legally 
independent, underived power," for example, Schmitt argues that this "is not the adequate expression of a 
reality but a formula, a sign, a signal. It is infinitely pliable, and therefore in practice, depending on the 
situation, either extremely useful or completely useless."4 Continuously stressing the "concrete situation",5 
as if it arrives un-signed, Schmittean sovereignty unaccountably escapes the undecidability of the sign, 
however, as it decides the exception.6  "The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in 
theology"7; a miraculous seeming without seeming which Machiavelli would immediately see-through. 
Machiavelli knows that lethal violence is never unmediated. Indeed 'cruelty well-used' is precisely this; 
killing as political signification. Machiavellian man enacts his freedom, instead, therefore, through his 
capacity not simply to read but also, and above all, to constantly re-write the signs of the times via a 
continuous calculus of necessary killing. Sign and sex are always powerfully related in Machiavelli also. 
Virtù is violent political semiotics as sexual potency; indeed, if we follow Machiavelli the dramatist, sexual 
potency is a play of political semiotics. For that reason I deliberately maintain the vocabulary of 'man. 
 
Subsequent sections analyse the nature of this Machiavellian moment of modern factical freedom. They do 
so, first, as a strategic moment. That strategic moment is acted-out, second, in the form of a war for, and 
through, the radically undecidable power of the sign. Factical freedom as semiotic battlespace is 
continuously required to signify how much killing is enough. But it can never resolve this strategic 
predicament because the very contingency of evental time upon which its freedom relies denies it the 
possibility of ever securely computing the strategic calculus of necessary killing which ultimately defines 
its moment. When asked to say how much killing is enough, whatever it replies, factical freedom is 
equipped to give only one answer: more. 
 
Locked in a strategic predicament which it can neither escape nor resolve, the Machiavellian moment of 
modern factical freedom is therefore analysed, also, as an aporia. This section nonetheless also explains 
that aporias are not passive conditions. Their very lack mobilises powerful political desires. Such desires 
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are acted-out in performative figures of political speech; of which the friend/enemy distinction might be 
said to be one. It is not however the one I am most interested in here.  
 
Many tropes characterise the performative enactment of the aporia of politics as factical freedom. Before 
going on to analyse divine violence as the definitive trope of factical freedom, however, a further section 
analyses an additional aspect of the Machiavellian moment. Strategic and aporetic, rather than 
chronological or dialectical, the Machiavellian moment of modern factical freedom is also promissory. That 
is to say, it is kairological. Its promise is the promise of the future itself. What is always already at stake in 
the promissory economy of the Machiavellian moment of modern factical freedom is not only the future of 
factical freedom, it is the future as factical freedom. No factical freedom, no future. 
 
Delivery is not, however, the only requirement demanded of factical freedom. Its killing is necessary not 
arbitrary. What establishes that necessity is a strategic calculus of necessary killing capable of computing 
how much killing is enough to realise, refresh and secure factical freedom against all the forces which 
threaten it; principally, in fact, those of the very time which enables it. If it cannot secure a strategic 
calculus of necessary killing, the Machiavellian moment becomes guilty of mere murder. It must therefore 
also deliver without being guilty of homicide; failing to establish the necessity of its killing. Its violence 
must therefore somehow expiate as it prevails. In want, however, of a strategic calculus of necessary killing 
which would do precisely that, by determining how much killing is enough, the only violence capable of 
meeting its requirement of 'cruelty well-used' is one so great that it will prevail without application; since 
any and every application, in practice, is subject to the fallibility of any and every strategic calculus in 
force. Such violence is the messianic violence which Walter Benjamin called 'divine violence'.  
 
In conclusion, while the paper proceeds by engaging Machiavelli through some of his most distinguished 
contemporary commentators, notably John Pocock and Miguel Vatter, it is nonetheless also written as a 
dark political allegory for our own times. The paper therefore concludes by posting a suspicion about those 
thinkers – Althusser, Badiou, Ranciére, Nancy, Agamben and Deleuze, among others - who seek a 
progressive politics from an evental account of time. An irony is intended to surround the conclusion's 
Deleuzean epigraph: "Philosophy's sole aim is to become worthy of the event." 
 
Factical Freedom  
 
"The alternative to action is delay and temporisation, and once time has become the domain of pure 
contingency, it is impossible to temporise because there can be no secure assumptions about what time will 
bring about; or, rather, the only assumption must be that, unless acted upon, it will bring change to one's 
disadvantage." 
(Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: 166) 
 
The essay first assumes that Machiavelli inaugurates the modern understanding of politics in general and of 
freedom in particular. 8  To analyse the predicament posed by Machiavellian freedom is therefore to analyse 
our own predicament as politically free in the modern way. Along with many commentators, the essay also 
acknowledges that this modern understanding of freedom is critically dependent upon Machiavelli's 
understanding of time. Time, here, is unaccountably given. It is governed by no law and it issues in no law. 
Here, ontologically speaking, Machiavellian time takes place as an event. 'Event', "not [merely] as a 
temporal punctuality or an instance of presence but, instead, as a dynamic open-ended field of forces, 
whose historicity prevents experience from closing into representational constructs, psychic spaces, or lived 
instances."9 Machiavelli's figure for this radical ontological contingency – a statement of the real in the 
form of temporality itself, expressed through a traditional divine personage - is Fortuna; capricious, 
indeterminate but, to a degree, seducible. 10 Machiavellian man is free, then, not because he is a bearer of 
rights but because the time in which he exists takes place without any divine, natural or historical warrant. 
 
Machiavellian time (modern political time) is itself, however, also comprised of evental encounters; 
correlations of historical forces and circumstances inviting intervention to change the course of time. The 
Machiavellian term of art for such encounters is riscontro. Intimately allied with a family of related terms 
including, in particular, occasione or historical events, rinnovazione or renewing, mutazione which is 
usually translated as adaptation, and modi, which is usually translated as 'manners' or 'modes' that permit 
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adaptation to the radical contingency of Fortuna, riscontro captures the kairological character of the 
Machiavellian moment as well, about which more shortly.11  
 
Modi are, in effect, performative figures of political speech. They bring a world into play. They might also 
be called political affects; capacities to move, as well as be moved by, the signs of the times. Time might be 
radically contingent and evental but it also comes to presence for Machiavelli, a playwright as well as 
diplomat and theoriser of the political, in language; a language of political signification finding its 
expression, especially, in rhetorical and literary tropes.12 The political 'modes' of factical freedom are 
therefore always modes of signification. No extra-discursive domain of existential enmity, for example, 
secures the political. Comprised of the freedom to signify, nothing in fact secures the political because the 
very power to signify politically lies in the radical undecidability of the sign. That there is an 'enemy' is not 
the issue, politically or analytically. Machiavellian man hardly needs to be reminded of the ever present 
reality of "killing", "combat", "fighting", "battle", "the possibility of conflict", or "publically disposing of 
the lives of men".13 This contrived realism is beside the point. The point is always and everywhere: which 
one becomes the enemy, and how?  
 
Machiavellian man is thus freed by the indeterminate nature of time to act into time to change the course of 
time if he contains within himself the wherewithal to do so. Indeed, if he is to enjoy his factical freedom, he 
must do so. In a Heideggerean sense Machiavellian man is therefore thrown: thrown into what Heidegger 
calls facticity, the experience of life as factical. "What is called 'factical life experience'? Heidegger asks.  
 
He answers:  
 
'Experience' designates (1) the experiencing activity, (2) that which is experienced through this 
activity...the experiencing self and what is experienced are not torn apart....'Experiencing' does not 
mean 'taking-cognisance-of', but a confrontation-with, the self-assertion of the forms of what is 
experienced....Factical does  not [therefore] mean naturally real or causally determined, nor does it 
mean real in the sense of a thing. The concept of 'factical' may not be interpreted from certain 
epistemological pre-suppositions, but can be made intelligible only from the concept of the 
historical."14 
 
Facticity is simultaneously therefore both historical and significatory. Along with Miguel Vatter, whose 
extraordinary work on Machiavelli is the primary inspiration for this essay, I therefore call the 
Machiavellian moment of modern freedom, factical freedom.15 An iron-bound necessity, finally, also 
attaches to the evental contingency of Machiavellian time. It arises through a revision, also deployed by 
Machiavelli, of the ancient correlation of contingency and necessity.16 Contingency is a predicament which 
cannot be escaped; but, one way or another, it is in some degree not simply appeaseable but calculable. 
 
To elaborate, then, factical freedom is not a negative or a positive form of liberty. It is neither a 'freedom 
from' nor a 'freedom to'. It is a 'freedom for'; for the assumption of one's throwness into time without law in 
order to bring law to time; a freedom to act into time to change the course of time, or not.  
 
Factical freedom is therefore construed also as a difficult freedom. It is not easily practiced and it is easily 
lost or, indeed, given up. For the moment we do not need to go into all the manifold reasons which 
Machiavelli gives for why it can be lost or surrendered. Suffice to say that, according to Machiavelli, the 
greatest threat to factical freedom is its own self-corruption: "for virtù brings forth tranquillity; tranquillity 
idleness; idleness disorder; disorder ruin; and similarly from ruin rises order; from order virtù; and from 
this, glory and good fortune."17 
 
Men are therefore continuously in danger of losing, or conceding, the art of practicing factical freedom. 
They become soft. They become corrupt. They may be inexpert and ill-advised, or lack the vigilance 
required to continuously maintain factical freedom through renewing it. They may simply become 
incapable of reading the signs of the times correctly or lack the courage and skill to act upon them. 
Necessarily both martial and imperial, how else could it prevail,18 factical freedom nonetheless commonly 
over-reaches itself. Freedom to legislate itself, factical freedom is therefore continuously both fallible and 
vulnerable. Thus weakened, it becomes prey to tyranny and loses its capacity for self-governance.19 
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One common Jeremiah of factical freedom is to bemoan its imperial overstretch, as if more judicious policy 
would somehow save it from the logic of its imperialising self-corruption. 20 Fear of the loss of political 
virtù consequent upon the detumesence of republican potency is another constant republican trope.21 
Revolution is continuously therefore required to renew factical freedom, because every form of rule 
atrophies freedom through the indolence it progressively instils in men. Factical freedom must therefore 
maintain a constant watch on itself and its condition or it will perish.  
 
In this account of freedom, "the notions of 'right' and 'virtue' can also never be reduced to a common 
meaning."22 Rights are ultimately a juridical phenomenon to which one lays claim, the virtue required to 
practice factical freedom is an affect which factically free men may or may not find within themselves, 
cultivate and practice.23 Roman virtus, 'Tuscanised' by Machiavelli as virtù, is the political affect for the 
Florentine. There is, however, a crucial difference between the two. The difference is this. "Romans," 
Pocock explains, "knew of virtus as a characteristic of the citizen and thought of it not only as exercised 
within a public discipline but as consisting in a religious respect for that discipline as a good in itself." In 
Machiavelli, however, "Virtù is capable of being used when the capacity is not disciplined by moral or 
political restraints. That is why Machiavelli can write of the Prince's virtù when it is being exercised 
illegitimately." "It denotes the individual's capacity for action," Pocock goes on, "including the political and 
the military."24 If there was, as Pocock says, "something primal about virtus"25 virtù extends and intensifies 
that primal quality. No longer simply part of a wider cult of civic religion, however, virtù, the capacity to 
act into time to change the course of time, itself becomes civic religion to factical freedom. In short, 
whereas virtus was part of a wider social and political cult, virtù itself simply is a cult. 
 
Appearance to the contrary, then, and despite the political anthropology of human cupidity which 
Machiavelli is also famed for proclaiming, the copula in Machiavelli does not ultimately concern 'man'. It 
concerns the nature of existence as historical time.26 Substituting history for divinity - Horkheimer amongst 
others noting that Machiavelli's new 'political science' is also "furnished primarily by the past,"27 - the 
Florentine interrogates how the problematic of politics must be posed and resolved when time is evental 
and freedom is unconditioned. Since no external law legislates the law of evental time, and no 
transcendental rule authorises rule, law and rule are the revolutionary historical accomplishments of 
political innovation which are not so much warranted by an order in nature, or history, as called for by its 
absence. 28 Their very possibility is afforded in time by time as the historically contingent event of what 
Vatter calls 'no-rule'.29 
 
For Machiavelli, the law does presuppose that individuals are bad or culpable by nature as a condition 
of positing that, "the law makes them good." The law is thus often figured in Machiavelli as a cure for 
the originary cupidity of man. But acknowledging the facticity of freedom, taking place in time as 
event, one must gloss the priority which is ordinarily accorded to this reading of Machiavelli. The 
factical freedom of the people, recognising the originary violent contingency of rule, is ultimately 
founded in the desire for 'no-rule'; rule both materialises factical freedom as political form but also 
vitiates factical freedom as originary freedom from rule. The more rules rulers make, the more the 
people are therefore compelled to 'cheat' and ultimately to revolt. Freedom must therefore redeem itself 
against the 'corrupting' effects of political form by returning to its origins in the desire for no-rule.  
 
This impulse finds its figure in 'the people' and, as Machiavelli observes: "The people ask nothing 
except not to be oppressed,"30 An opening of time to be seized by a factical freedom continuously 
threatened by its own political accomplishments, but renewed by its political virtù, evental time 
conditions all that is politically possible for time conceived as history, and for man thus conceived as 
the free agent of his own mis-fortune. By means of this onto-political logic, Machiavelli institutes a 
novel account of the circulatory character of political time. Natural law must ultimately return to 'God'; 
the providential source of what John Locke called the original grant of dominion and governance in 
common which institutes the civil society of contract.31 With Schmitt, sovereign law must ultimately 
return to existential enmity; a miracle freed from the radical undecidability of the sign which 
simultaneously founds and expresses a decisional political will. Machiavellian man returns neither to 
God nor the Enemy. He returns to the origins of freedom in the temporal event of time as 'no rule'; a 
continuous re-turning, riddure ai principii, that posits all political authority in continuous polemical 
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tension with the unconditioned freedom, expressed as signification, which simultaneously both founds 




"It is the use of an engagement for the purpose of the war." 
(Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Book One, "Strategy": 177) 
 
It is precisely here in Machiavelli, therefore, that we first hear the modern assertion that the primary 
characteristic of political action is strategic behaviour; that the man of virtù is a strategos.  Politically 
grounded in the question posed most starkly by another political strategiser, Lenin, in terms of, "What is to 
be done?" this strategic 'what' nonetheless also demands a strategic 'how'; a reliable strategic calculus.  
There is, nonetheless, a profound difference between the strategic situation of Leninist man and that of 
Machiavellian man. That difference further illuminates the character of factical freedom, in as much as 
Machiavellian man confronts an aporetic strategic challenge. Leninist man labours under the illusion that 
he is indemnified by the dialectic of history. His tropes, of good and evil, are in a sense already pre-
inscribed. If his strategic predicament is not already fully resolved, an historical movement is, however, 
said to be underway which guarantees that it is resolvable, at least in principle.  
 
Machiavellian time is not providential time. That we understand. But neither is Machiavellian time 
dialectical time. This we do not necessarily understand, because so many commentators including his most 
astute commentators persist in labelling Machiavellian time dialectical when their very own most 
sophisticated interrogations establish that it is not.33 However much the wheel of fortune turns, it is 
perfectly evident from Machiavelli, and indeed his commentators, that time is not dialectical and that 
Fortuna is no dialectician. The time of the event has no unity and the factical freedom which it grants 
enjoys no guarantees of any spiritual or temporal description. Factical freedom is instead condemned to 
rely upon its own  continuously changing political artifice to figure-out how to act into time to change the 
course of time in order to renew its freedom in circumstances which are challenging in continuously novel 
ways, because time, and the times themselves, are radically contingent.  
 
To repeat, such contingency is both ontological and historical. There is no order to time here, and time 
issues in no order. Order is a human accomplishment. It is, as Hobbes was later to put it, artefactual. Thus, 
as Vatter acutely observes, there is no rule to rule. The contingency of any and every rule may, therefore, 
be revoked in favour of the necessity of another rule, which necessity is demanded by continuous change in 
the signs of the times.34 If the factical freedom of the Machiavellian moment is to have a political calculus, 
it has therefore to be fashioned from historical examples which display virtù - "Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, 
Theseus and the like"35 - rather than from those attuned to some telos or dialectic of time.  
 
In addition, however, men's actions compound, they do not resolve, the ontological contingency of time 
historically. Men do what they do, but they cannot command the outcome of what they do. Human action 
itself creates contingency as well. Thus, by the 17th and 18th centuries, the radical contingency of factical 
freedom was argued-out in Atlantic societies, and especially through Anglo-American political discourse, 
in terms of the crisis of political obligation it posed, and the many novel devices, such as covenant and 
contract, by which the passions and the interests, in which contingency was by then said to lie, might be 
transformed into what Victoria Kahn appositely called, "binding political significations".36   
 
Factical freedom's condition is therefore strategical not dialectical. In fact, the dialectic is not strategic at 
all. In its concern with the transcendent unity and historical order of time it is, of course, profoundly onto-
theological. The difference is summarised succinctly by Foucault. ''Dialectical logic'', he says, ''is a logic 
which plays with terms which are contradictory but within the element of homogeneity...which promises to 
dissolve them into one unity.'' Strategic logic is concerned instead, ''to establish the possible connections 
between disparate terms which remain disparate''. ''The logic of strategy'', he continues, ''is the logic of the 
connection of the heterogeneous and it is not, repeat not, the logic of the homogenization of things which 
are contradictory.''37 Strategy is thus an ars combinatoria, rather than an ars differentia. It reads the 
heterogeneous signs of the times in order to fashion timely interventions into the course of time, 
continuously seeking to secure itself against all the changing correlation of forces which distinguish the 
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changing nature of the times, not least those at play within the play of factical freedom itself. It does so, 
quintessentially, renewing time by making time. It is ultimately creative rather than reactive. It must be. For 
time itself provides no order or law to be represented. Rule is made, and applied, not discovered. Factical 
freedom does not, therefore, simply encounter strategic predicaments. Factical freedom is a strategic 
predicament.  
 
Posed by the radical contingency of evental time, the strategic predicament of factical freedom is therefore 
also a continuously emergent "concrete situation". Such a continuously emergent situation is 
simultaneously also, however, an emergency; hence the immediacy, urgency, and brutal instrumentality, of 
Lenin's rendition of it. From Machiavelli and many others of course, we also understand that the ultima 
ratio of such strategic behaviour is force and violence. Strategy does not simply concern the application of 
force; it expresses the purely instrumentalised will to power of free agents in a universe construed as the 
spielraum of their factical freedom. As a strategic predicament, factical freedom is therefore intimately 
allied with violence. This is not a contradiction. Violence is not a paradox of freedom. Neither is violence 
one political instrument among others for the factically free. If factical freedom is essentially strategical, 
and the essence of strategy is violence, to be factically free is to be violent - strategically. Every strategist 
of the modern period, including also, iconically, von Clausewitz, has proclaimed as much.38 
 
The very grid of intelligibility which governs the strategic problematic of modern freedom, being factically 
free, is therefore that of modern war: specifically; will to power as the deployment of force for the 
realisation of the political objective of exercising factical freedom. Machiavelli is no more acute, no more 
remorseless in his analytic of factical freedom, than in his frank recognition of the violence required to be 
factically free. Famously, he calls it the art of 'cruelty well-used.' Says Machiavelli: "Well used cruelties (if 
one may speak well of evil) are those that are done all at once, when it is necessary to secure oneself, and in 
which one does not persist, but are converted into the greatest possible advantage of the subjects."39 
Continuously reading the heterogeneous signs of the times, paying special attention for example to those 
historical exemplars who are claimed to have done so successfully in the past, particularly by excelling in 
the arts of war, strategy is a martial semiotics concerned not only with reacting to the times but with taking 
charge and reshaping them; signalling a new order for the times. As archetypal republicans, modern 
Machiavellians, in the second Bush White House, for example, embraced precisely the same idea: "We're 
an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality - 
judiciously, as you will - we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's 
how things will sort out. We're history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we 
do."40 
 
Factical freedom is thus a semiotic battlespace.41 Contemporary military strategic discourse, and the 
"effects based operations", of the so-called 'information age', in the US and the UK especially but more 
widely also across the Atlantic world, now frankly describe it as such.42 Weaponising information as much 
as it informationalises weapons, factical freedom in the 21st century explicitly proclaims itself as war 
pursued for the power of the sign through the very undecidability of the sign.43 Its significatory devices - 
modi - are demonstratively constitutive and experimental.44  
 
Thus the Machiavellian moment of modern factical freedom is not only a strategic moment rather than a 
dialectical moment; it is also a continuously emergent moment, one which enacts a permanent crisis. The 
emergency of the historically emergent freedom of republican virtù is, then, evental not juridical. It 
concerns that universalised, sexual and gendered potency, expressed historically as pro-active politically 
strategic intelligence, or virtù, the loss of which would eventuate in the loss of freedom as such. This 
political trope is no arcane theoretical issue. It is endlessly played-out in the popular culture as well as the 




"Must heaven speak? It has already manifested its will by striking signs....It is up to us to do the rest."46 
(The Prince, Chapter xxvi) 
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First entering on stage as a metaphor referring to an autonomous force outside the subject, by chapters 6-7 
of The Prince, Machiavellian contingency - Fortuna - is redefined as that which is produced by a lack of 
virtù. Factical freedom's very condition of possibility, contingency becomes an alibi also for political 
failure; the loss of virtù.47 Contingency will only prevail over the freedom which it grants if factical 
freedom becomes deficient in virtù; "[Fortuna] exercises her power when no barriers are erected against 
her; she brings her efforts to bear upon ill-defended points."48 Thus, virtù is no slave of time; not least 
because time as event is an opening not a determinant. Fortuna ultimately becomes a sign of the violent 
non-coincidence of actions and times; a symptom that virtù has given up the goal of changing the times.49 
Freed from blind chance as much as from providence, and possessed of virtù, this critical Machiavellian 
revision of the classical problematic of the necessary and the contingent50 allows factical freedom the 
potent polemical force to act into time to change the course of time by virtue of the potent freedom which 
evental time itself makes possible.51  
 
The advent of a new form of political discourse here, the opening of time as significatory event in 
Machiavelli, also concerns the very eventalness of the sign itself. As temporality becomes historicity so the 
historical becomes archival and the archive becomes the inevitable subject of interpretation.52 Machiavelli 
himself is a master of this interpretive art. Everything in his world 'signifies', but nothing comes with stable 
meaning pre-installed. No sign is certain and no sign signifies unless it is circulated and read. In this respect 
Machiavelli was a man of his times and might well have been familiar with Lorenzo Valla's historically 
grounded linguistics, together with its attack on referential understanding of language: "Words uttered by 
Men are indeed natural, but their meaning is determined by conventions." 53 Ultimately there is no 
controlling the circumstances of its reading. Posing as mere historical observer, but understanding that in 
this cockpit of factical freedom the sign must be successfully instrumentalised, if Fortuna is to be mastered, 
so that time can be bent to political intent, Machiavelli struggles to divine how the radical undecidability of 
polysemous signification itself can be tamed politically. 
 
Signification is thus the discursive currency of all political intercourse. Machiavellian man is thereby 
compelled to struggle with the currency of the sign - in Greek sēmē means 'coin' as well as 'sign' or 'word'54 
- in ways which recall Renaissance, as well as our own, understandings of the equally uncanny power of 
money.55 While disavowing rhetoric through a nonetheless rhetorically powerful discourse of the real, itself 
a classic rhetorical trope, even within The Prince Machiavelli cedes the radical polysemous instability of 
the sign and the absent presence of the real he continuously invokes.56 Since the timing of signing is 
everything, the exemplars of political reputation of which he continually invokes are unmasked. They are 
not real historical examples at all; but counterfeited species of political exchange coined, circulated and 
deployed by Machiavelli himself to buttress an account of freedom – the Machiavellian moment - which 
conditions our own political times.  
 
But he was perhaps too much the dramatist, and too much the Renaissance man, to be entirely seduced by 
the idea that such a manoeuvre could master the sign. In any event, ontologising as he historicises he writes 
the very ontology of the real, which he claims merely to discover, back into the history from which he 
claims to draw it out; so that he can discover it there. Thus does he underwrite the political freedom he 
espouses as he claims simply to record it. Machiavelli's 'real' is the virtuoso product of his own art of 
political signification. 
 
It is not, however, simply a matter of the referent of 'the real' escaping the web with which signification 
seeks to ensnare it because the polysemous power of signification renders the sign undecidably contingent 
on the unpredictable circumstances of its circulation and its reading. The referent of 'the real' continuously 
escapes the web of signification because the very power of the sign, as such, lies in the fact that it cannot in 
fact be securely represented against any so-called 'reality' if it is to continue to signify.57 Rhetoric besides, 
Machiavelli's political reality is plainly an effect of the deconstructive power of signification itself. For that 
very reason it is radically undecidable.  
 
Whereas virtù is an affect of character, all character nonetheless presupposes a related form of skill or 
intelligence.58 Some form of expertise, however crude, correlates with character, however simple. Virtù is 
allied to what the Greeks called metistic intelligence; the cunning of 'seeming'.59 Notoriously proclaiming 
himself a realist, then, what Machiavelli actually does is describe how political virtù might be capable of 
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conjuring the effect of 'the real' on command through the metistic arts of political invention. The very 
metistic intelligence of political virtù nonetheless always requires something in excess of itself to make it 
work, the sign itself; the deconstructive donation of evental time in the form of Logos. It is unaccountably 
given to man, and yet also contingently shaped by man. Given time, Machiavellian man is also obliged to 
make time for himself metistically.60 
 
Albeit deception is one of the arts of the Machiavellian prince in particular, whether or not deception is 
intended the sign is fated to dis-simulate if it is to fabricate. Machiavelli knows this. Politics thus unfolds in 
a continuous experimental play of appearance; "...when it is a matter of judging the inner nature of Men, 
above all of princes, since we cannot have recourse to courts we must stick only to consequences."61 
Consequences themselves are, however, subject to political interpretation; such, indeed, is Machiavelli's 
own historical game. Politically speaking, then, polysemic signs are a force to be conjured with. 
Machiavellian man is more Magus than rational analyst, strategist or political scientist. 
 
Free to act into time to change the course of time by a radical contingency which can never be mastered yet 
must be artfully played, because time's arbitrary giveness continuously subverts its translation into history 
via political fabrication, Machiavelli's political exemplars are archetypes. Abstracted from their age, their 
own conjunctures of time and place, these exemplars are entirely unreal. It is only in the form of maxim 
and cliché that they can ever be made to appear politically effective at all. Machiavelli's Moses, for 
example – a standard Renaissance trope, implausible from start to finish as a 'real' historical character – can 
be taken to stand for them all.  
 
Moses first appears in Chapter 6 of The Prince which is concerned with those who acquire new princedoms 
by dint of their own virtù and military self-sufficiency. Thereafter, he last appears in the Discourses, where 
Machiavelli gives a slightly more extended account of the political lessons to be drawn from a comparative 
analysis of the fate of Moses, Savonarola, and Piero Soderini a contemporary Florentine political operator.  
 
Moses was, however, neither a prophet nor a prince. He did not, as Machiavelli maintains, found a religion, 
a people, or a state. The Jews had followed a law - having observed a covenant with Yahweh from the time 
of Abraham - before Moses became the reluctant conduit for transmitting another to them. What sort of 
leader was this biblical Moses? asks one humanist scholar. She replies: "Accidental, reluctant, obstinate, 
despairing, - and in the worst Machiavellian fate hated, thus ruined by the people."62 A killer, reluctant also 
to deliver his people from Egyptian bondage, contesting his election by Yahweh, Moses, "died alone in a 
foreign wilderness, divinely obstructed from entering the Promised Land."63 By Machiavellian standards of 
effective leadership, "biblical Moses was incompetent"64; and, "fatuous [especially] for the Exodus" 
incident on which Machiavelli drew.65 More to the point, Machiavelli's Moses, claimed to be derived from 
"continuous study of the ancient world...diligently analysed and long pondered"66 was a hackneyed cliché 
of renaissance rhetoric.  
 
A parade of authors had conscripted Moses name for ideological political ends with flattering but 
false comparisons to Plato's philosopher-king, the Bishop of Basil Caesarea, the emperor 
Constantine, the king Mathias, and a procession of popes. Machiavelli the opportunist inserts his 
artifice into this convenience. Yet, however, preposterous their extrapolations from Scripture, the 
allegorists did not boast of historical purpose or erudition, as he did, but specified their 
contemplative intentions. Machiavelli's abuse of scripture is fabulation."67 
 
In thus positing 'significatory realism' shot through with undecidability, and not merely political fraud, 
Machiavelli's evental time re-problematises knowing as much as doing. For all he proclaims it realist, 
Machiavelli's politics is strategic experimentation inflected with more than a touch of magical realism. 
Outputs are always fated to become outcomes; the often unintended consequences not simply of what men 
do but of the unpredictable impact of their actions on the wider evental political economy of reputation and 
seeming into which their factical freedom throws them: "For a prince then it is not necessary to have in fact 
all the above-described [virtues] but it is very necessary to appear to have them."68  
 
The Florentine's vocation was nonetheless at least as political as it was philosophical.69 Within the compass 
of such an evental understanding of time, Machiavelli was primarily concerned with telling us how men 
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act-out their factical freedom. In particular, he was concerned to tell us what men are required to do if they 
are to retain their freedom by resolving their strategic predicament; determining how and when to act into 
to time to change the course of time by specifying how much killing was enough to do so. For time as event 
does not simply free Machiavelli's man, or time, from cosmological determination. Reposing both the 
nature of man and time Machiavelli ties them back together in a novel, historically political, relationship. 
Time becomes the radically contingent history that free men make in necessarily violent pursuit of their 
mis-fortune.  
 
It is important to be absolutely clear about the character of the necessity which attaches to killing here. 
Killing may be said to be necessary for all sorts of reasons. Factical freedom is not distinguished by the fact 
that it is necessary to kill, alone. If it were, then factical freedom could not be distinguished from any other 
political regime claiming that it is necessary to kill. Killing is not only instrumentalised, here, it is 
instrumentalised in the name of freedom. The referent object of this killing is freedom. It is necessary to 
kill to be factically free. Its strategic calculus of necessary killing is governed by the question how much 
killing is enough to remain factically free. 
 
As it frees politics from cosmological determination, the radical contingency of evental time thus 
immanently conditions the very operationality of the Machiavellian moment. Machiavelli offers us both 
praxiology and an ontopolitical account of this condition. Central to its praxis is command of signification: 
"Must heaven speak? It has already manifested its will by striking signs....It is up to us to do the rest."70 
Through command of the signs of the times Machiavellian man seeks the command of time: "I also believe 
that he is happy who can match his way of proceeding with the qualities of the times."71 Just as no praxis is 
ontologically innocent, however, no ontology is praxiologically insignificant.  
 
Machiavelli's thus teaches something fundamental also about the co-production of ontology and practice in 
the reading of the signs of the times. Existence takes place as history in the form of signification.72 It is 
therefore pointless to try and decide which comes first: time or sign. What appear to be two things is in fact 
one, albeit double. In Machiavellian terms, historical events (occasione) are encounters (riscontro) through 
which the institution and reconstitution of political form continuously emerge in the significatory modi of 
political action.  
 
Probing the entailments of a political facticity which owes its account of freedom to a radically contingent 
temporal ontology, itself finding historical expression in the polysemous undecidability of the sign, since 
factical existence takes place as signification and strategy derives from command of the sign,73 Machiavelli 
must struggle to immanentise the rule of meaning in the polyphenous play of political signs in order to 
secure the success of doing. In the process, he cannot but be ontological as he claims to be practical. He 
cannot but be practical and historical as he expresses an ontology; an account of the real which demands 
certain practices. The Machiavellian moment thus acts-out the significatory undecidability through which 
the materiality of its strategic condition is constructed. It does so through a wide variety of dividing 
practices and political tropes, including those concerning, for example, sexuality as well as strategy; since 
virtù is nothing if not political savvy as sexual potency. Definitive of it is, however, strategic understanding 
of cruelty well-used and the 'balls' to use it.74 
 
Ontology and historicity thus irrevocably contaminate one another in the Machiavellian moment. (When do 
they not?) That contamination reverberates throughout the modern politics of the factical freedom of the 
event which Machiavelli inaugurates.  In the event, whatever historical man makes of the Machiavellian 
moment, his political action is irreducibly indebted to the unaccountable donation of time even as it seeks 
to make its own time as history. If the very supplementarity of time makes factical freedom, it also breaks 
it. 'Given time' remorselessly deconstructs historical time, all the time.75 
 
Machiavelli is notorious only because he insisted on what other champions of this account of freedom 
elide. If the Machiavellian moment is, as John Pocock expressed it, a matter of, "...the republican ideal 
[posing] the problem of the universal's existence in secular particularity,"76 its political economy of 
emancipation requires a corresponding political economy of violence. Unless it can specify, historically, 
who for freedom's sake must die, the killing it does will merely perpetuate a vicious cycle of violence rather 
than a virtuous circle of emancipation. If we go on to ask from whence derives the strategic purchase of 
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cruelty well-used, Machiavelli answers clearly and consistently. It is on the minds of men; specifically their 
capacity to use and read signs. If this theatre of cruelty and politically inspired death is to have its effect it 
can only do so as the lethally calibrated signification of a power that none will mistake in its effect and in 
its expiation of the killing that it must do. But we, along with Machiavelli also, know all about the power of 
the sign.77 Its power cannot be escaped but neither can it be secured. Neither effect nor expiation is, or can 
be, guaranteed by it. This is the strategic predicament of factical freedom. 
 
Other regimes may therefore be murderous or genocidal. Their violence may be an expression of some 
mythic tribal, racial, sexual, gendered, tyrannical, religious, totalitarian, oligarchic, or charismatic essence: 
what Benjamin calls mythic violence, or, "bloody power over mere life for its own sake."78 Factical 
freedom is not like that. It is not power over mere life for its own sake. It is power over life in the event of 
life to express and enact the evental freedom of life; the very capacity for vivere civile which distinguishes 
it from other forms of existence. Its essence lies in its being free to read the signs of the times to act into 
time to change the very course of time via a strategic command of signification, a generic weaponisation of 
the temporal event of Logos that renders violence politically instrumental in the cause of freedom. 
Machiavellian man is therefore not free in this way because he is bad. Though bad he undoubtedly is: "All 
those who have written upon civil institutions demonstrate (and history is full of examples to support them) 
that whoever desires to found a state and give it laws must start with assuming that all men are bad."79 The 
bottom line is that men are bad because factically they are free.80  
 
Enacting a realm of radically contingent time, political timing for the factically free is a matter of being 
contingently effective throughout time via the art of cruelty well-used.81 Factical freedom must therefore 
always be well-played at the limit of its condition, and its condition is always and everywhere at the limit. 
Republican virtue seeks to instantiate a republican sociality, or world. Its world is a jealous one. Like 
capital, republican virtue finds that there can only be one world if the republican world is to prevail. In the 
event, those free men who cannot kill well, politically, will ultimately live and die less well because they 
will lose their freedom. "I conclude that, since circumstances vary and men when acting lack flexibility, 
they are successful if their methods match the circumstances and unsuccessful if they do not."82 Required to 
kill well politically, the Machiavellian moment of modern factical freedom revolves around the permanent 




"Aporia rather than antinomy." 
(Derrida, Aporias, 16) 
 
Here we approach the nub of the argument. Factically free, Machiavellian man – modern man – is 
continuously confronted with the eternal return of a moment, the Machiavellian moment, which poses the 
same politico-strategic question. The Leninist formulation of this question was: What is to be done? But 
having reviewed Machiavelli's insistence on the ultima ratio of factical freedom being the art of cruelty 
well-used, we are in a position to restate this strategic formulation. Put simply, the question is this: How 
much killing is enough?  
 
What factical freedom ultimately requires to enact being factically free is thus a strategic calculus of 
necessary killing. But none such is available. Indeed within the orbit of contingent time which enframes 
factical freedom none such is possible; there is no law to time, time issues no law, and the signs of the 
times are radically undecidable. It would be profoundly mistaken, however, to think that therefore nothing 
can be done. Anything may be done. Anything is often done. Indeed, as it turns out, anything and 
everything must be done, if necessary. Such killing escalates because factical freedom is, in fact, incapable 
of answering the question how much killing is enough? The point, then, is that, for all the emphasis on his 
strategic savvy, when he kills Machiavellian man cannot know for sure what he does, does; hence the 
sobering reminder provided by the epigraph which heads this essay. Crossing the threshold of violence 
initiates independent dynamics beyond the strategic calculating and pre-cognition which Machiavellian 
man brings to it. What he views as instrumental, political calibrated violence, is no such thing. It is an 
independent variable which shapes him more than he shapes it. Admitting as much, biographies and 
autobiographies of Machiavellian men often depict them as gamblers or tragic heroes; usually a mixture of 
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both.We are now also in a position to understand two other closely related questions: why salus populi 
becomes the supreme law of republican freedom, and what happens to the discourse of peace when it does 
so. The Machiavellian moment of modern factical freedom is practically defined by the requirement to 
have a strategic calculus of necessary killing which will answer the question: How much killing is enough? 
A politics thus modelled on war, the logos of war becomes the logos of peace. How? Through the discourse 
of security: "to act in politics is to expose oneself to the insecurities of human power systems, to enter a 
world of mutability and peripeteia whose dimension is the history of political insecurity."83 Hence the full 
tag, salus populi suprema lex esto.84 Discourses of security are the everyday means by which the logos of 
peace is inscribed with the logos of war. When you hear politics and life described in terms of security, you 
are listening to politics and life described in terms of war. 
 
In the Machiavellian moment of modern factical freedom, peace therefore becomes the extension of war 
through securitisation of the everyday vivere civile of republican virtue. This sources the watch which the 
republic must permanently exercise on and against itself: "That a Strict Watch should be kept on the 
Doings of Citizens," titles Machiavelli in one of his discourses, "since under cover of Good Works there 
often arises the Beginning of Tyranny."85 Directed towards all actual and virtual enemies of the republic – 
any one and anything can be such – this impetus to instantiate and continuously re-secure the republic 
through approximating a form of power so great that it would work without use, and in thus prevailing 
without bloodshed thereby also expiate, bears down most, therefore, on the republican persona itself; 
individual and collective. For it is there that the Machiavelli teaches us that republican virtù is continuously 
won and lost.  
 
External threat may therefore aggravate and excite, or otherwise provide an outlet for, but it does not 
constitute the originary fear which constitutively stalks, the Machiavellian moment of modern factical 
freedom. That fear is sourced, instead, from the very ontopolitical conditions of evental temporality which 
provide factical freedom with its original warrant.86  Nothing is more corruptive of this freedom, however, 
in its continuous cycle of exhaustion and renewal, than the relentless surveillance and limitless violence 
required to reproduce and secure it. Herein, then, lies the intense aporia which also defines it. 
 
If the radical contingency of time frees Machiavellian man for the task of continuously reinventing and 
renewing his freedom in the incalculably contingent correlation of forces which comprises time, 
ontologically and historically, it simultaneously also therefore deprives him of the very possibility of the 
strategic calculus required to secure his freedom politically. Factical freedom thus poses an irresolvable 
problem to itself. Its strategic predicament is therefore also an aporia. To be factically free is to be in want 
of a strategic calculus of necessary killing; one which would resolve the problem of cruelty well-used, 
which is to say answer the question how much killing is enough.  
 
There is no escape from this predicament, for the factically free, and there is no solution to it. That is 
precisely what an aporia is: an inescapable and irresolvable predicament. This does not mean to say that 
nothing happens in an aporia. As Richard Beardsworth brilliantly explains, in his still unrivalled account of 
Derrida and The Political:  
 
"An aporia demands decision, one cannot remain within it; at the same time its essential 
irreducibility to the cut of the decision makes the decision which one makes contingent, to be made 
again. The promise of the future (that there is a future) is located in this contingency."87 (emphasis 
added) 
 
In this specific instance, factical freedom lacks the strategic calculus of necessary killing which would 
secure its freedom and differentiate its killing from mere murder.  
 
This lack is, however, the well-spring of its complex and most powerful political desire, the desire not only 
to capitalise instrumentally on the event of its very own eventalness but to relive it also of the guilt imposed 
by its necessary killing. The Machiavellian moment is not only therefore strategic, significatory and 
aporetic. To realise one's power, while expiating oneself of the guilt associated with the violence necessary 
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to it, effects a conjuncture which is as much auspicious as it is decisional. The Machiavellian moment of 
factical freedom is therefore also kairological. 
 
Without a strategic calculus of necessary killing equal to the task of teaching it how much killing is enough 
to continuously renew the promise of freedom, modern freedom founders in its own murderous adventure. 
What it requires as a condition of its very operationality is precisely what it can neither fashion nor 
discover without invoking the divine; a power which not only prevails, but also expiates as it does so. Pace 
Carl Schmitt, and others, the theological absolutism of Christian divinity upon whose model this necessity 
must ultimately draw is not only all powerful; it also has the power to forgive sin and expiate guilt which 
the freedom to make law entails. In this instance, the guilt associated with necessary killing in want of that 
strategic calculus which would teach factical killing how much killing was enough; the guilt, in short, of 
the strategic aporia of the Machiavellian moment itself.  For all it proclaims itself religiously sceptical, and 
politically secular, therefore, modern freedom invokes the all-powerful expiating force of the sacred in the 
process of enacting its necessary killing, not simply to prevail but to prevail legitimately; expiating the guilt 
of killing without sufficient reason because no such reason is ultimately available to it. Here we approach 





"...what we take hold of when we seize kairos is not another time, but a contracted and abridged chronos." 
(Agamben, The Time That Remains: 69)  
 
In an "Afterword" written for a new edition of the Machiavellian Moment almost thirty years after the 
book's initial publication, John Pocock gave more attention to the idea of a 'moment' than he had in his 
original text. In fact he identified several different ways in which the concept of 'moment' was deployed 
and might be further deployed. Elucidating the concept of moment, however, raises more questions about 
the strategic and aporetic character of the Machiavellian inheritance of the Atlantic tradition than Pocock 
addresses. We have to go through and beyond Pocock to get to them, and, by this means, to the last two 
points of my argument concerning the kairological nature of that moment and its characteristic appeal to 
'divine violence'.  
 
The first understanding of moment Pocock tells us is the original or what he calls, "the historic 'moment' at 
which Machiavelli appeared and impinged upon thinking about politics."88 A second is the methodological 
concept of moment characteristic of the Cambridge School of political thought, which advocates "the return 
of texts to the contexts in which they were first written."89 A third moment extends this methodological 
application of moment to the mobility of texts in time: "the fortunes of texts, and the discourses they may 
be said to have conveyed as they travel from one context to another," specifically the fate of Machiavellian 
texts as they moved, "from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century and from Florence to England, 
Scotland and Revolutionary America."90 None of these moments especially concern my argument.  
 
A fourth account of moment, however, and the point at which Pocock's analysis begins fruitfully to exceed 
the historical confines he nonetheless tries to set for it, derives from what he calls the two "ideal" moments 
indicated by Machiavelli's writings: "the moment at which the formation or foundation of a 'republic' 
appears possible"; and, "the moment at which its formation is seen to be precarious," entailing a "crisis in 
the history to which it belongs."91 These turn out to be a single moment, "The 'Machiavellian moment' as 
that in which the republic is involved in historical tensions or contradictions which it either generates or 
encounters."92 Pocock then provides a succinct account of the aporetic character of this moment: "Here we 
might say, was the original 'Machiavellian moment'; the free republic set itself problems it might not be 
able to solve."93 But there is an additional quality to this Machiavellian moment. Pocock touches upon it 
when recognising 'something primal' about the character of virtus and, a fortiori, also of virtù.94  
 
In this elaboration of 'moment', Pocock himself thus takes us beyond the idea that the Machiavellian 
moment is a simply an historical moment. Everything Machiavelli says, and everything incidentally that 
Pocock also says, establishes that there is no telos to history, and no dialectic at work within it, access to 
whose logic would guarantee the success of strategic interventions into the course of time. The 
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Machiavellian moment is therefore not simply an historical moment, chronological or dialectical, since, as 
Pocock observes, it is also, for Pocock at least, an 'ideal' moment. It refers to an account of what it is to 
exist, and what is entailed by existing, in which there is always already an excess of existence as such over 
particular historical forms of existence; the unaccountable giveness of time and its taking place historically. 
Strategic and aporetic, in which the aporia contains the very promise that, in Beardsworth's terms, there is a 
future to come, the Machiavellian moment of modern factical freedom is ultimately not only a strategic and 
aporetic, it is also a kairological moment.95  
 
The French historian, Monique Trédé, lays out in great detail the various senses of the term kairos that 
emerge from the time of Homer to end of the 4th century B.C., and their employment in both rhetoric and 
politics.96 She carefully analyses, in particular, the political sense of the kairos as that moment of 
opportunity, decision and promise which must be seized by timely strategic interventions characteristic of 
the practices of rhetoric, medicine and politics alike. As Pierre Aubenque also put it, kairos is, "the moment 
when the course of time, insufficiently directed, seems as if to hesitate and vacillate, for the good as well as 
for the bad of man,"97  
 
It was no coincidence that kairos was especially associated with rhetoric and with medicine in the ancient 
world, for it was concerned with reading signs in order to fashion timely interventions. It called for a 
symptomology of audiences in rhetoric, as much as it called for a symptomology of the body in medicine. 
The same also obtained in its application to politics and war. In Greek the strategos was the one who held 
the sign which men followed in battle.98 Thucydides similarly described kairos as a situation which elicits 
political and military leaders to act at a strategic or appropriate time in order to achieve the optimum result.  
The kairos, then, understood as that right time to act or to make political decisions, consists in both the 
perceiving and the seizing of the moment.99 Kairos nonetheless also assumed a powerful Judeo-Christian 
inflection. That inflection emphasised the promise which also lies within the kairological moment.100 This 
promissory inflection is powerfully at work within the Machiavellian moment of modern factical freedom. 
 
A spatio-temporal event of time without warrant, kairos is not (simply) chronological and it is not 
dialectical, but neither is it an expression of time as duration.101 In its persistent recurrent eventalness, 
kairological time is a kind of 'now' time, a suspension of time in expectation of a future always to come. In 
as much as it requires that the ways in which we live are fashioned by the requirement to live in 
anticipation appropriately of it, kairos too demands its own related form of governance.102 The time of the 
instant, indeed of time itself as the 'time that remains', kairological time is the eternal return of the same 
recurrent moment in which human being must assume its factical freedom and engage the mis-fortune 
offered by its indeterminate existence. One is thus always in the position of deciding and of being decided 
in the kairological time of factical freedom.  
 
Something else is, therefore, going on here. The Machiavellian moment of modern factical freedom not 
only necessitates strategic decision. It not only poses an inescapable condition and an irresolvable problem 
as well. And, it is not simply the fact of its lack – the impossibility of a strategic calculus of necessary 
killing - which propels its political desire. If it were only a strategically aporetic moment its problem would 
be epistemological; lack of the strategic competence to resolve its predicament. However, its lack is not the 
impossibility of secure knowing.103 To be sure, there is a 'not knowing', or to be precise an impossibility of 
secure knowing. But structure of the lack which propels the Machiavellian moment of modern factical 
freedom is ultimately not epistemological. It is not, simply, the absence of secure knowing.  
 
Factical freedom is, in addition, an auspicious moment, because factical freedom is not only always yet to 
come, it is a yet to come in which the power that will prevail prevails not only over other powers but does 
so in expiation also of the guilt associated with the exercise of the violence of that power itself. Strategic 
and aporetic, the Machiavellian moment of modern factical freedom is therefore also, and most definitively, 
a kairological moment. Hence, the lack which drives the strategic and aporetic character of the 
Machiavellian moment of modern freedom is 'promissory'. It is precisely this promissory auspiciousness 
which makes the event of factical freedom – its very temporality - messianic.104 More to the point, 
however, such a moment requires its appropriate mode (modi) of governance. The object of vivere civile, 
the very cult of the civic virtù of the Machiavellian moment of modern factical freedom is ultimately to 
secure Machiavellian man for the coming of factical freedom.  
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The promise is not simply that it is possible to be free in this factical way. Much more than factical freedom 
ultimately also depends upon factical freedom. What is always already at stake in the promissory economy 
of the Machiavellian moment of modern factical freedom is not only the future of factical freedom, it is the 
future as factical freedom. For the promise of factical freedom is that only factical freedom can deliver the 
future: that the future arrives through the factically free. For good reason, then, the messianic promise of 
the kairos of the Machiavellian moment requires that the people remain constantly worthy of the event of 
factical freedom. If they do not, then the very opening of the world itself is endangered. 
 
Let us be clear. The messianic moment, is not the Messiah.  No one comes. No one has come. No one will 
come; necessarily so. In the Machiavellian moment of modern factical freedom there is only political 
becoming; the crisis condition of the emergency of guiltless emergence in which the politics of freedom 
must continuously revolutionise its own re-formation by returning to its radically contingent foundation in 
the rule of no-rule, evental time, or founder. What kind of force is then required for factical freedom to 




"Necessary wars are just wars, and when there is no other hope except in arms, they too become holy." 
(Livy, quoted in, The Prince, 88n.) 
 
Machiavelli's realism notoriously expels God from the affairs of the state. His interest in religion is 
evidently conditioned by his preoccupation with what empowers political action and strengthens civic 
virtù.105 Commentators miss the point of the divine in Machiavelli's political thought, as much as they do in 
our own, however, when they pose the issue in terms of the sociological relation of politics to religion.  
 
Religion, as sociological phenomenon, is precisely not the point. Citing Livy, in his appeal to Lorenzo de' 
Medici to unite Italy, Machiavelli appears ultimately to intuit that factical freedom must somehow therefore 
also become holy in the aporia of its strategic necessity if it is not to be lampooned as murderous farce. 
Indeed must become messianic in its call for the transformation which expiates as it prevails; the double 
move which defines and distinguishes the saved. The point is instead, then, the religious structure of the 
Machiavellian moment. To be precise: how its necessity obliges it to become holy. It becomes holy in the 
necessity of enacting a strategic aporia which it cannot resolve while seeking to realise an emancipatory 
promise that it cannot escape.   
 
Since neither God, telos nor dialectic is available to do the job, the violent debt incurred by self-enactment 
must redeem itself through self-enactment. It must itself become divinely violent; for only divine violence 
is simultaneously both omnipotent and expiatory. Seeking to redeem the emancipatory promise of freedom 
as self-emergent historical becoming in evental time - guiltless overcoming - factical freedom ingests the 
godhead; divine violence, "pure power over all life for the sake of the living," 106 The expiating violence of 
such divine violence is similarly, also, that of self-sacrifice.107 The factically free are obliged to die for 




"Philosophy's sole aim is to become worthy of the event." 
(Deleuze) 
 
As Althusser's brilliant reflections in Machiavelli and Us first indicated, the freedom of the event which 
Althusser first detects in the Florentine remains a continuing source of inspiration for many contemporary 
political thinkers who seek to revivify the Machiavellian moment of republican freedom as a means also of 
challenging the global violence of the military and commercial systems which now dominate its 
contemporary Atlantic expression.108 At issue in such critical responses to the deeply derelicted state of the 
Machiavellian moment today is however the aporetic violence of evental freedom itself. For critical 
thinkers run the danger of eliding the problematic of violence, with which the 'event' of factical freedom is 
irredeemably contaminated, when seeking to renew the emancipatory promise which it offers. This 
suspicion prompts caution in drawing on Althusser, Badiou, Ranciére, Nancy, Agamben, and Deleuze, 
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among others, when appealing to the emancipatory promise of time as event in pursuit of a liberationary 
politics.109 For what Machiavelli makes plain, not only in The Prince but throughout The Discourses, The 
History of Florence and The Art of War as well, is that cruelty well-used is the sine qua non of factical 
freedom.  
 
Variously depicted as scientific manual or revolutionary manifesto, we can thus interpret The Prince, 
especially, as first interrogating the irresolvable state of emergency of freedom as continuous emergence 
which characterises the politically modern; an emergency of emergence which is as religious as it is 
political.110 In as much as Machiavelli offers the first account of the modern project of founding political 
freedom, of constituting the republic as political form in the aporetic facticity of its historical condition, he 
is not however instituting grounds for a state of emergency in the ways that Schmitt and Agamben have 
done, as a function of sovereign power and its necessary suspension of the law.111 The return to origins 
which renews political freedom in Machiavelli is a return to the aporetic condition of the radical 
contingency of the evental time first said to inaugurate it. The state of emergency here is aleatory 
materialism; the emergent emergency of factical freedom itself. 
 
Once institutional religion became subordinate to the state, an understanding of grace lost and conscience 
fatally attenuated in its privatisation, factical freedom was thus free to rampage globally as an imperialising 
cult of 'civic' power. 112 Subverting its very own moral and political precepts of a civic life enacting itself 
through republican virtù, in the American Republic especially, the Machiavellian moment of the Atlantic 
world is now characterised by the endlessly strategising rule of techno-scientific, capitalistic, media and 
military oligarchies whose very excess acts-out a Bataillean political economy of violent expenditure rather 
than a classical political economy of republican prudence.113  
 
Aporias, like that of the Machiavellian moment, therefore take place. They are not abstract. They are acted-
out. Acted-out in performative figures of political speech is the way in which they come to presence and 
constitute a world. They circumscribe a grid of political intelligibility and comprise a tropology as well as a 
topology of political life. Such a terrain of political self-enactment is as mobile as it is material, and it 
ramifies. For all it requires a strategic calculus of necessary killing, however, it is not possible for factical 
freedom therefore to determine how much killing is enough, politically, to resolve the emergency of its 
emergence. Its lethality thus mounts as its return to the promissory facticity of its freedom raises the 
political stakes by demanding new capacities to kill beyond even the industrial proportions acquired during 
the course of the 20th century. When it thus resorts to the invocation of divine violence, in the way that its 
military strategic discourse as well as its electoral and policy rhetoric, especially, now do, factical freedom 
betrays the very emancipatory promise for which it kills. So enthralled do 'we' seem to have become by the 
civic promise of the Machiavellian moment, however, that we have hardly begun to address, let alone 
develop effective analytical mechanisms for interrogating, the abiding religiosity and cultic violence which 
characterises its aleatory materialism most.114 
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